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This paper contributes towards the growing debate concerning the world distribution of in-
come and its evolution over that past three to four decades. Our methodological approach is
twofold. First, we formally test for the number of modes in a cross-sectional analysis where
each country is represented by one observation. We contribute to existing studies with
technical improvements of the testing procedure, enabling us to draw new conclusions, and
an extension of the time horizon being analyzed. Second, we estimate a global distribution
of income from national log-normal distributions of income, as well as a global distribu-
tion of log-income as a mixture of national normal distributions of log-income. From this
distribution we obtain measures for global inequality and poverty as well as global growth
incidence curves.
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11 Introduction
Since the early 1990s a renewed interest in cross-country income convergence has been moti-
vated by a growing literature concerning growth theory and growth empirics as well as general
economic welfare questions. Two main questions are the centre of this debate. Firstly, in how
far could the observed change of the income distribution and possible cross-country convergence
either support or refute the neo-classical growth model, which, given its assumptions, would im-
ply some type of conditional1 ¯-convergence across economies. Alternatively, in how far could
the change in world cross-country income distribution support the strand of new growth the-
ories in economics? Secondly, could the change in cross-country income distribution o®er any
insight into the ranking and relative income di®erences of economies and thus make suggestions
concerning global welfare and income inequality. Obviously, a divergence of cross-country per
capita income toward two di®erent peaks would suggest the existence of multiple equilibria for
di®erent national economies and thus a poverty trap for the world's poor nations. This would
call for intervention through economic policy possibly adjusting the parameters of respective
growth models such that the observed diverging trend could be reversed.
However, as others before, we strongly caution to assume that a divergence within the
cross-national income distribution is automatically equal to a divergence of the global income
distribution and/or global welfare deterioration. Clearly, it has certain advantages to analyse
the behavior of average national per capita income as the unit under scrutiny, the national
economy, is a major policy maker in particular with regards toward economic growth models.
Hence, if national income growth is the key to welfare improvement it is important to understand
the factors hampering or fostering growth, which might be studied best by comparing national
economic performances. However, in order to consider global welfare, the actual global income
distribution should be of more concern than the cross-country per capita income comparison.
Thus, in this paper we distinguish between three di®erent types of distributions. Firstly, the
classic cross-country or cross-national income distribution in which every country is treated as
a single observation. Secondly, a weighted cross-national distribution in which national income
averages are weighted by the countries population share. Lastly, we calculate a mixed-lognormal
1 Conditional on the parameters of the extended Solow model governing the countries under inspection. Thus,
the neo-classical growth model is not contradicting a twin peak convergence club phenomenon as such. This
is due to the fact, that if two groups of countries are governed by di®erent parameters, but display within
group homogeneity of parameters, it would imply a divergence of the two groups, but a within group
convergence of economies to their respective group steady state.
2global income distribution, which gives an estimate of the income distribution for all the world's
citizens.
This paper contributes to the existing debate in two ways. Firstly, it places the existing
literature on a sounder empirical footing by proving econometrically that the cross-national
per capita income distribution does indeed display and tend to an ever stronger bimodal or
even multimodal distribution. In order to prove this, we apply a non-parametric method -
the Silverman test - using boundary kernels which accounts for the non-negativity of income
data of the cross-country income distribution. This allows a sound econometric test for the
existence of uni- vs. bimodal or even multimodal distributions, which cannot be strictly inferred
from visual inspection or cross-country regressions alone. Furthermore, the Silverman test is
not only applicable to the economic questions stated above, but a useful econometric tool for
various economic questions that have the behavior of a distribution at heart. Secondly, and
more importantly, it introduces an alternative approach of a mixed log-normal distribution
to model a world income distribution which allows us to answer fundamental global welfare
questions. Hence, utilising this global income distribution we report the evolution of global
income inequality and poverty, applying various standard measures. Furthermore, we construct
global growth incidence curves that indicate which semi-decades experience the highest rates
of pro-poor growth. Moreover, we compare our results with existing studies concerning global
income distribution (in particular Sala-i-Martin, 2006) to support or refute their conclusion.
The paper is structured as followed: Section 2 will discuss the methodology of the Silver-
mann test and, following Bianchi (1997), we derive results for the classic cross-national income
distribution approach. Furthermore, we estimate in Section 3 the world-income distribution as
a mixture of the respective national income distributions, where the weights of the mixture are
determined by the proportion of the nations population relative to the world population. The
national income distributions are modeled parametrically by a log-normal distribution, where
the parameters of the log-normal distribution can be determined form the real PPP GDP/per
capita and the Gini of the respective country. The resulting estimate of the world income dis-
tribution allows to obtain conclusions regarding global income inequality, poverty and rates of
pro-poor growth.
32 The Classic Cross-National Income Distribution:
Revisiting the Twin Peaks Debate
2.1 Introduction
The convergence hypothesis states that poorer economies are growing faster than richer ones,
hence, catching up such that eventually there will be no di®erences between real average per
capita income across countries. This would imply a unimodal cross-national distribution of
income2 which should become constantly less dispersed. The literature distinguishes between
two types of convergence ¯-convergence and ¾-convergence (Sala-i-Martin 1996). By de¯nition
¯-convergence occurs, if the coe±cient on initial income is negative when regressed on the
change of log real income, or in words, if initially poorer economies grow on average faster than
the initially rich. Moreover, ¾-convergence is de¯ned as the decrease of the dispersion of the
entire income distribution. If there are no other control variables in the growth regression, we
speak of absolute ¯-convergence, which would be a necessary but not su±cient condition for
¾-convergence. Not su±cient due to the fact that due to rank switching ¯-convergence can
be shown, whilst the dispersion of the income distribution remains unaltered. Thus, for the
convergence hypothesis to hold we need absolute ¼-convergence and ¾-convergence such that
the income distribution converges to one common mode.
In the empirical growth regression literature, which is based on the neo-classical growth
model (Mankiw, Romer & Weil 1992, Barro 1991, and many more), the initial income term
is always signi¯cantly negative in cross-country growth regressions, as long as certain other
basic parameters of the neo-classical growth model are controlled for. Hence, we ¯nd consistent
and very robust conditional ¯-convergence in a wide array of growth regression speci¯cation.
However, conditional ¯-convergence by no means implies a unimodal convergence of the income
distribution, as conditional ¯-convergence only shows that, given certain parameters controlling
for each countries steady state, countries further from their steady state undergo faster growth
due to transitory dynamics. Thus, a twin peak or in fact multimodal income distribution is
theoretically no contradiction to the neo-classical growth model (Mankiw, Romer & Weil, 1992,
Gailor, 1996)3. Only if all parameters of the extended Solow growth model (including technology
2 All income data is real per capita GDP PPP as reported in Summer, Heston and Aten (Penn World Tables
6.2)
3 Clearly the size of the coe±cient would imply a certain speed of transitory dynamics and thus values for
4and human capital) would be homogenous globally we would expect absolute ¯-convergence and
¾-convergence to occur and the lack thereof to refute the neo-classical growth model. Hence,
new growth theories such as the AK or the Romer model (Romer, 1991) which are, due to the
lack of marginal returns, in theory applicable to all conceivable income distributions cannot be
shown to be superior on the grounds of a lack of unimodal behaviour of the income distribution4.
Furthermore, other models (for example Bernard & Jones, 1996) help to reconcile this debate
by explaining the existing convergence pattern via the behavior of technological change. Thus,
the cross-national convergence debate as proof for either strain of economic growth theory is
misguided.
However, the behaviour of the cross-national income distribution is for many other reasons
of great interest. In particular, the development of twin peaks would characterise a world
of growing cross-country average income polarization and suggest the existence of multiple
equilibria, which would call for policy intervention. Numerous papers (Jones, 1997; Quah,
1996a, b; Sala-i-Martin, 1996) have this debate at heart and discuss which type of convergence
governs the development of the cross-national income distribution and what is to be expected in
the future. In particular, they show that a focus on ¯-convergence is informative on the nature
of intra-distributional dynamics but cannot convey information concerning the development of
the entire distribution, which appears to be polarizing. In order to overcome this traditional
shortcoming of the ¯-convergence debate, probabilistic income mobility models are used to
estimate likelihoods of convergence groups. Hence, debating whether the twin peak phenomena
is persistent as probabilities are too low (Quah, 1996a,b) or only a temporary occurrence due
to increasing frequencies of growth miracles (Jones, 1997) 5. Our test results contribute to the
overall debate by statistically demonstrating the emergence of twin peaks in the cross-national
income distribution.
2.2 Testing for Twin Peaks: Methodology & Data
Following most other papers our analysis is based on income data from the Penn World Tables
Version 6.2 (Summer, Heston & Aten, 2006), from which we extract the real PPP GDP/per
capita and the population series for all years and countries available. In order to compare our
parameters of the production function, but it has been shown elsewhere (Mankiw, Romer & Weil, 1992; O
Galor, 1996) that the obtained results are in principal conceivable with the stylized fact
4 despite all other merits they might posses
5 for a short summery of the cross-national convergence debate in general see Durlauf (1996)
5observations over time, we restrict ourselves to those countries having complete income data for
the whole time period considered. This restriction leaves 93 countries for the period from 1960
to 2003 and 127 countries for the period 1970 to 2003 in our analysis. In the second case these
countries represent about 90 percent of the world¶s population.
A simple way to look at the world income distribution is a cross-sectional analysis where
each country is represented by one observation. Kernel density estimates are widely used to get
an impression of the underlying distribution in such or similar cases. Suppose that x1;:::;xn
are independent observations with density f. The kernel density estimator for the density f is
de¯ned by









where h > 0 is a smoothing parameter, called the bandwidth, and K is a kernel function which
integrates to one. The features of the resulting estimate ^ f(x;h) such as peaks and valleys
strongly depend on the choice of the bandwidth and to a lesser extend on the choice of the
kernel function K.
Silverman (1981) observed that the number of modes (i.e. of local maxima) of ^ f(x;h) is a
monotonically decreasing and right-continuous function of the bandwidth, if one uses the stan-
dard normal density as kernel function K. He used this fact to de¯ne the k-critical bandwidth
hc(k) as the smallest bandwidth such that ^ f(x;h) still has k modes, and not yet k + 1 modes.
Intuitively speaking, if the k-critical bandwidth hc(k) is large, a lot of smoothing is required so
that the density estimate ^ f(x;h) only has k modes. This indicates that the target density f
might have more than k modes. In order to put this observation into a statistical test and to
assess its signi¯cance, Silverman (1981) suggested to use the so-called smooth bootstrap, details
of this method can be found in Silverman (1981), Fisher et al. (1994) or Bianchi (1997).
Bianchi (1997) ¯rst applied Silverman's (1981) test to the world distribution of real PPP
GDP/per capita. We shall do a similar analysis here, over the extended time-horizon up to
2003 for both the PPP GDP/per capita itself as well as for its logarithm. Furthermore, we take
into account some technical modi¯cations and extensions. In fact, it is well known that the
critical value of the Silverman test, based on the smooth bootstrap, is conservative. Thus, if one
tests the hypothesis Hk that the density f has at most k modes against the alternative that it
has more than k modes with a nominal level ®, the actual level of the test will be quite below
®. Hence, one does not reject the hypothesis Hk often enough. For testing the hypothesis H1
6of single mode against more than one mode, Hall and York (2001) suggested a calibration of
the critical value so that the test actually achieves its nominal level. We used their calibration
method in this (most important) testing situation. Furthermore, the PPP GDP/per capita is
evidently a non-negative quantity, and it has a strong mode near zero. In order to avoid the
bias problem near zero (cf. Wand and Jones, 1995), for the original PPP GDP/per capita data
we use a renormalized version of the Gaussian kernel (boundary kernel) near zero. As shown
in Fig. 1 and in contrast to Figs. 1 and 5 in Bianchi (1997), taking into account the boundary
a®ect makes the strong mode near zero much wider.
At this point, it has to be stress that the number of modes of the original income does not
neccessarily have to be equal to the number of modes of the logarithmized distribution. This
is because the density g of the logxi is g(t) = f(et)et. Taking the derivative, one sees that
the derivative g0 will possibly have a di®erent number of zeros than f0, and thus g will have a
distinct number of modes. If one is interested in the number of modes on a linear scale, one
should use the original income data but if one wants to investigate modes on an exponential
scale, one should use their logarithm.
2.3 Results of Silverman's test
Our analysis for the period 1970 to 2003 supports the ¯ndings of Bianchi (1997) for 1970 to 1989
and carries them onward until 2003. In table 2 we give the results of the tests starting in 1970
in 5 year steps and including 2003. While the hypothesis of one against more modes cannot
be rejected in 1970 at a 5% level, it can be rejected for all consecutive years. Furthermore,
it can be observed that the corresponding p-values have a tendency to decrease, increasing the
statistical signi¯cance of the second mode. The hypotheses of two against more modes can never
be rejected, con¯rming the bimodal structure of the density. The test results of the years 1960
to 2003, based on a smaller number of countries, are displayed in table 1. The results correspond
to those for the larger sample. In 1960-1970, the hypothesis of one mode cannot be rejected at
5%, afterwards, it is always rejected in favour of two modes.
For the log-income data the results di®er. As shown in tables 1 and 2, the hypothesis of one
mode cannot be rejected for any year at a 5% level. However, the p-values decrease strongly
over the years up to 2003. Moreover, starting from 1980 the hypothesis H2 that the density has
two modes can be rejected at a level of 5% in favor of three modes. These results are at a ¯rst
7glance somewhat counterintuitive. The interpretation is that there is statistical evidence that
the density is not bimodal, it is either unimodal or it has three modes. Since the p-values for
H1 (and also H2) decrease over time, while the p-value for H3 (three modes) strongly increases,
we expect that the log-income density evolves toward three, not too signi¯cant modes. This is
also re°ected in Fig. 2. The optimal bandwidth gives a density estimate with three modes in
2003, all of which, however, are not too signi¯cant. In fact, the distance between this \optimal"
density estimate and the density estimate based on hc(1) is not very large, either. To conclude,
the log-income distribution appears to evolve from a unimodal density in 1970 toward a density
with three modes in 2003, which is, however, still close in shape to a unimodal density, i.e. its
additional modes are not very distinctive.
We conclude that our ¯ndings cannot be reconciled with the absolute convergence hypothesis.
However, this does not imply a contradiction to the concept of conditional convergence or the
neo-classical growth model. Nevertheless, the twin peak divergence indicates, if one asumes the
neo-classical as true, that some poorer countries are stuck in a poverty traps as long as a number
of structural conditions do not improve.
3 The global income distribution and welfare implications
3.1 Approaches toward a population weighted cross-national or global
income distribution
The classical cross-national income comparison approach su®ers from severe shortcomings if
one wishes to draw conclusions concerning global welfare, inequality or poverty. The major
problem of the simple cross-sectional approach is the fact that the observation of Luxemburg
counts as much as the observations of, for example, China or India. Therefore, the average
welfare of a Luxembourgian is weighted much higher than the welfare of the average Chinese.
Thus, more recently a number of papers have shifted the debate away from the classical cross-
national income distribution approach towards a global income convergence analysis. Two
main approaches have been utilized. The ¯rst group of papers is based on the classical cross-
national income distribution but where the observations are weighted by the nations' respective
population (Theil, 1979; Berry, Bourguignon and Morrisson, 1983; Theil & Seale, 1994; Schultz,
1998; Firebaugh, 1999; Melchior, Telle & Wiig, 2000).
8Unfortunately, there is no well de¯ned way of how to weight the observations. The number
of modes and the whole structure of the distribution in fact changes when di®erent weights are
used. This is due to the fact that the concentration which is given to each observation is only
well determined relative to the weight given to other observations but not in absolute terms. In
other words, by variation of the absolute concentration one can more or less create any number
of modes one wishes. Thus, this method allows for the comparison of weighted means, but is
not well suited for the estimation of a global income distribution.
The second group of papers model the global income distribution, or a distribution limited
to major economic players, by taking into account the underlying national income distributions
(Dowrick & Akmal, 2005; Bourguignon & Morrisson, 2002; Quah 2002; Sala-i-Martin, 2002a,
2006). In fact, an objective way to construct the global income distribution from the distinct
national income distributions is as a population weighted ¯nite mixture of the national income
distributions. Intuitively, if one picks at random an individual with a certain income from this
global income distribution, one ¯rst randomly draws the country its belongs to (with probability
equal to that countries proportion in the world population), and then obtains its income from
the corresponding country income distribution.
The problem in this approach is hence to determine the national income distributions. Sala-i-
Martin (2006) argues that from the methodological point of view, one should use nonparametric
kernel estimates instead of parametric models for the country income distributions, since these
do not assume any speci¯c shape for the income distributions. While we agree with it on the
methodological basis, in our opinion nonparametric modelling would require actual income data
of all required countries, and on a comparable basis. Sala-i-Martin (2006) uses national accounts
and survey data for the estimation process. However, these are only available for some of the
relevant countries (groups A and B of his analysis), and even they are not really comparable.
Because of this lack of relevant data, we prefer to model the national income distributions
parametrically as log-normally distributed.6 The relevant parameters of each countrie's log-
normal income distribution can be readily determined from its real PPP GDP/per capita and
its Gini coe±cient (cf. Section 3.2). Hence, the amount of data required for this approach is far
less than for non-parametric estimation of the country distributions. Even though the log-normal
6 After this work was completed, we became aware of a preprint cited in Sala-i-Martin (2006), " The world
distribution of income estimated from log-normal country distributions", Sala-i-Martin, 2004, in which he
seems to use a similar approach. We were however not able to obtain this paper.
9distribution may not be a completely adequate model for each countrie's income distribution,
the e®ect will be small on the ¯nal world income distribution obtained as a population-weighted
mixture. In addition to requiring less and more readily available data, our approach also has
some methodological merits. In particular, the resulting global income distribution (a ¯nite
mixture of log-normal distributions) is much easier to handle than a non-parametric analogue,
and it is e.g. easy to sample from this distribution. We will exploit this advantage to construct
growth incidence curves of the world income distribution for several years.
3.2 Methodology & Data
As stated in Section 3.1, the national income distributions will be modelled by using a log-normal
distribution. Formally, the log-normal distribution LN(¹;¾) is de¯ned as the distribution of
the random variable Y = exp(X), where X » N(¹;¾) has a normal distribution with mean ¹









; x > 0;
and its mean and variance are given respectively by
E(Y ) = e¹+¾
2=2;





We should brie°y discuss discuss the interpretation of the parameters ¹ and ¾, which is di®erent
from that for the normal distribution. In fact, from (1) one sees that log ¹ is proportional to the
expectation and (log¹)2 is proportional to the variance, and in fact, log ¹ is the scale parameter
of the log-normal distribution, whereas ¾ is a shape parameter. Since the Gini coe±cient should
be invariant under changes of scale (it should not matter whether income is measured in Euro
or in dollar), it should be independent of ¹ and only depend on ¾. This is indeed the case: The




10where © is the distribution function of the standard normal distribution. Therefore, the para-










¹ = log(E(Y )) ¡ ¾2=2:
In summary, the parameters ¹ and ¾ of each countrie's log-normal income distribution are easily
determined from the real PPP GDP / per capita (EY ) and its Gini G. While these data are much
more readily available than the whole income data of the countries, the coverage of inequality
measures, such as the Gini, does not start in earnest until the late 1970s or even 1980s. The
biggest inequality database available is the UNU WIDER dataset, which reports all available
Gini measures of inequality with additional information concerning area covered and base data
utilised. Due to di®erent methodology, the reported Ginis are not fully comparable over time
and countries. However, GrÄ un and Klasen (2006) carefully constructed a more consistent Gini
dataset based on WIDER raw data. Hence, we utilize their much improved dataset 7 as our
basic inequality data set. Furthermore, as inequality does not change too dramatically over
time, we assum that the ¯rst real observation of the Gini in any given country to be equal to
its initial (1950) level of inequality. Starting from this initial level we used a moving average to
catch changes in trends of inequality for the periods for which our data coverage was extensive,
mostly past the 1970s.
To conclude this section, we formalise how the density of the world income distribution fW
is obtained as a mixture of national (log-normal) distributions. Assuming that there are n
countries under investigation and that the (log-normal) density of the distribution of country i





where pi is equal to the proportion of country i¶s population in the whole population of these
n countries. It has to be stressed that although the density fW is a simple ¯nite mixture of the
component country densities f(x;¹i;¾i), this does not transfer to relevant quantities such as the
7 We would like to thank GrÄ un and Klasen for providing their dataset.
11Gini or other inequality or poverty measures: the world Gini GW is not simply the corresponding
¯nite mixture of the country Ginis Gi. Nevertheless, once the parameters of the density fW are
estimated, it is not di±cult to estimate all relevant inequality and poverty measures by Monte
Carlo simulation from fW. To this end we used a random sample from fW of size 105. Finally,






where Á(x;¹;¾) is the density of the N(¹;¾) Thus lfW is simply a ¯nite mixture of normal
densities.
3.3 Convergence, Global Inequality and Poverty
Figures 3 and 4 show estimates of the global income distribution as well as of the log-income
distribution, determined as discussed in Section 3.2, for selected years. Two things are apparent
at a ¯rst glance. Firstly, the average global income increased dramatically over the given time
period. Secondly, the global world income distribution has become less dispersed over time.
Interestingly, the 1970s still seem to display a twin peak phenomenon in the global log-income
distribution, however, these twin peaks disappear over the years and in particular between 1990
and 2003. Thus, the results show clearly global income expansion and convergence of real global
individual income in $US (PPP). One hypothesis might be that the increased globalisation of
the time period lead to a further integration of the world citizens' income. The inequality
measures reported in Table 4 con¯rm this ¯rst impression as all measures decline over time. In
particular, a persistent decline of global income inequality can be observed past the mid1970s,
as can be seen in Graph 7. This date roughly corresponds to a relative income growth loss in
the West due to the oil price shocks and a simultaneous increased income catch-up of mainly,
but not exclusively, the South East Asian Tigers, followed by China and later India.8 Thus,
the median global citizen did not only get richer over the given time period, but additionally
his or her relative income position as compared to the top 5 percentiles of the global income
distribution improved considerably. This pattern becomes even more apparent if one considers
what happened to poverty and percentile speci¯c growth.
An estimation of global poverty is inherently tricky and controversial due to multiple method-
8 A paper concerning regional decomposition of the above results is in preparation.
12ological shortcomings. All poverty lines are in many ways arbitrary as they depend on re-
searchers' choices of what is poor and how this de¯nition is compared across space and time.9
Nevertheless, a poverty line is useful as it allows researchers to use a bench mark and track
poverty changes over time and space given the de¯nition of poverty. The best known and most
cited poverty line is the $1 or $2 (PPP, 1993) per day poverty line developed by the World
Bank. This poverty line is supposed to be the monetary minimum to cover basic needs and is
to be used as an expenditure poverty line in household surveys. Ravallion (2004) 10 has argued
that the expenditure poverty line should be roughly half of an income poverty line, thus our $2
US (PPP) applied to income should be roughly comparable to the World Bank's $1US (PPP)
poverty line applied to expenditure data. 11 In the end we decided to stick to the World Banks
de¯nition as it allows our results to be comparable to other results by Chen and Ravallion (2004)
and Sala-i-Martin (2006). Furthermore, we show in ¯gure 6 that any reasonably selected poverty
line would show a decline in the poverty headcount ratio as the cumulative distribution func-
tion of global income of subsequent time periods are dominant over the cumulative distribution
function of the prior time period. Our poverty line is set at $469.9 US (PPP) and $935.45 US
(PPP) a year, which corresponds to the World Bank 1993 poverty line of $1.08 US and $2.15
US per day adjusted to our income baseline year 2000 respectively. 12







for the poverty headcount (®=0), poverty gap ratio (®=1) and the squared poverty gap (®=2)
(should include the poverty gap squared). The results are reported for our $1 and $2 a day
poverty line respectively. Furthermore, the absolute number of people below the two poverty
lines is reported. It is apparent that from 1970 to 2003 all measures of poverty, absolute
and relative, declined strongly. The percentage of the world population living below $1 a day
declined drastically from 22 percent in 1970 to 5 percent in 2003. The reduction of this measure
of extreme poverty was particularly rapid in the 1970s and early 1980s as the headcount ratio
9 Reddy and Pogge 2005
10 The Economist 2004.
11 However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the advantages or disadvantages of certain poverty
lines.
12 adjusted to our 2000 base year $1.08 (1993) per day = $ 1.287 (2000) per day = $469.9 per year. In the
case of the $2 line $2.15 (1993) per day = $2.562 (2000) per day = $935.45 per year
13dropped from 22 percent in 1970 to 8 percent in 1984 which corresponds to a decline of the
absolute number of people living with less than $469.9 (PPP, 2000) per year from slightly over
800 million in 1970 to roughly 380 million in 1984. From 1984 to 2003 the headcount fell further
to 5 percent which corresponds to about 315 million people living below $469.9 (PPP, 2000)
per year. Moreover, the poverty gap ratio also displays a constant decline over the given time
period, hence, not only did the absolute number of people living in extreme poverty fall, but
those which remained poor saw their income improved towards the poverty line.
The results for the $2 poverty line follow a very similar pattern. The headcount declined
strongly from 45 percent, almost half the world's population, in 1970 to 14 percent in 2003. The
most dramatic decline of the $2 headcount was in the late 1970s and the 1980s from 44 percent
in 1975 to 21 percent in 1990. Overall, the absolute number of people who lived below $935.45
(PPP, 2000) per year declined from 1,654 billion in 1970 to 880 million, in 2003. Furthermore,
the poverty gap or "distance" of those people below the poverty line to the poverty line declined
also considerably. Thus, all conceivable measures of poverty show a dramatic decline of global
poverty in relative and even in absolute terms, although clearly some decades and some regions
experienced more pro-poor progress than others.13 In order to gain a better understanding
concerning the behavior of the world income distribution and the semi-decade speci¯c rates of
pro-poor growth a look at the subsequent global growth incident curves is highly informative.
Figures 7 and 8 show global growth incidence curves for di®erent time periods 14. The
main results are summarised in table 5 below. Firstly, if one considers the entire observation
period it is apparent that the middle percentiles of the global income distribution experienced
the highest growth rates. In fact, the growth rate from the 10th to the 65th percentile of the
global population experienced income growth rates above the mean of the growth rates of all
percentiles which is equal to 2.67 percent per annum. Thus, the bottom-middle of the global
income distribution experienced the fastest income growth which also explains the declining
income inequality and global income convergence. This e®ect is slightly counteracted by the
less than average growth performance of the bottom 10 percentiles, with the poorest percentile
experiencing the lowest income growth overall. Furthermore, the global average income grew
by 1.9 percent per annum, where as the median global individual experienced a 3.3 percent per
13 an analysis of the regional decomposition is in preparation
14 see Chen & Ravallion, 2003
14annum income increase. The rate of pro-poor growth 15 for the $1 per day poverty line exceeds
with 2.55 percent per annum the growth rate in mean by 0.65 percentage points per annum.
Hence, the 34 years from 1970 to 2003 can be termed pro-poor in the relative sense, as the poor
experienced higher income growth rates than the average income. For the $2 per day poverty
line the period was even more pro-poor as the rate of pro-poor growth with 2.97 percent per
annum exceeded the growth rate in mean with even 1.7 percentage points per annum and is even
greater than the mean percentile growth rate. Hence, the global growth incidence curves over
the period from 1970 to 2003 con¯rm and strengthen our inequality and poverty results above, as
it shows that over the 34 years the income of the poor 16 has grown much faster than the average
income. In fact, the bottom-middle income percentiles experienced the highest income growth
rates explaining global income convergence, declining inequality and falling poverty headcounts.
More results from above are con¯rmed if one looks at decade speci¯c growth incidence curves.
For the ¯rst half of the 1970s the top and bottom percentiles of the global income distribution
experienced the highest growth rate. If one considers the $1 per day poverty line these years
experienced relative pro-poor growth, which is not the case if one applies the $2 per day line,
as the bottom-middle of the income distribution experienced only modest growth rates. The
second half of the 1970s are characterized by the strongest global growth performance of 2.53
percent per annum in mean income and can be considered poverty neutral if one considers the
$1 per day line and relatively pro-poor for the $2 per day de¯nition. It is apparent that the
12th to the 67th percentile had higher growth rates than the average percentile growth rate and
thus the bottom-middle of the global income distribution gained the most.
The ¯rst half of the 1980s can be considered the most pro-poor over the given time period as
the 2nd to 47th percentile experienced very high growth rates compared to the top percentiles.
Unsurprisingly, the mean grew by only 1.01 percent per annum, but the rate of pro-poor growth
was 5.17 and 5.11 per annum for the $1 and $2 per day poverty line respectively. The second
half of the 1980s experiences an increase in the global mean income growth rate to healthy 2.11
percent per annum and is characterized by negative pro-poor growth rates for the extreme poor,
at -0.72 percent per annum, and lower than average pro-poor growth rates for the poor, at 1.11
percent per annum. This is mainly due to the fact that even the bottom percentiles from 1st
15 which is the average growth rate of the percentiles below the poverty line as de¯ned by Chen & Ravallion
2003
16 again no matter which conceivable reasonable poverty line is applied
15to 6th experienced an income decline and that overall percentiles, which are considered to be
poor under the $1 and $2 per day de¯nition, had been extremely reduced from the previous very
pro-poor growth spell. In fact, above mean percentile growth rate was achieved by the 20th
to the 67th percentile and for the top 3 percentiles, so the bottom-middle half of the income
distribution did catch up further to the upper percentiles. However, the very bottom of the
distribution which was still considered poor gained very little. Thus, the 1980s have been the
most pro-poor from a global perspective 17. In particular the bottom-middle percentiles grew
consistently closing the income gap between the developing and developed world which can also
be seen if one looks at the log-income distribution where the twin peaks start to dissolve over
the course of the 1980s. One hypothesis might be that the onset of globalization and export-
led growth strategy enabled many global poor to participate in the global growth process in
particular in China and South East Asia.
This pattern of global income convergence carries over into the 1990s, as the ¯rst ¯ve years
can be considered relatively pro-poor under the $2 per day poverty line de¯nition, but not under
the $1 per day poverty line de¯nition, which comprise only the lowest percentiles. Moreover,
the second half of the decade is relatively pro-poor for both poverty lines as the very bottom
percentiles experience very high growth rates. The highest growth rates over the decade are
achieved by the inter-quartile percentiles that experience above mean percentile growth rates
and implies further global income convergence over the 1990s. Hence, at the end of the 1990s no
hint of a second peak in the log-income distribution remains. The overall growth rate of mean
income follows the previous decade pattern with the ¯rst half being characterised by relatively
slower growth rates, 1.44 percent, per annum than the second, 2.37 percent.
For the ¯rst four years in the new millennium the growth rate of mean income has slowed
down again to 1.29 percent per annum. The rate of pro-poor growth is below the average income
growth rate with the bottom percentiles growing at only 0.82 percent per annum for the $1 per
day poverty line and 0.94 percent for the $2 per day poverty line. The highest growth rates are
observed in the upper-middle part of the income distribution.
In the end, our results insinuate that most global poor nowadays live in countries which are
most likely stuck in a poverty trap. In other words, even though the global income distribution
is converging, due to the tremendous integration of many former developing countries into the
17 even though the 1980s are considered the lost decade in Latin America not that much of the Latin American
population comprised the very poor in the global scheme of things
16"global economy" and a connected income catch-up, it is equally clear that most remaining
poor live now in countries which have so far missed out in this process. These are the countries
characterized by low average national income which make up the lower mode in the cross-
national income distribution and the lowest percentiles in the global income distribution. It is
those countries which need to make headway, if one wishes to reduce global poverty further.
Moreover, as often reported before, these countries are mainly in Sub-Saharan Africa, in which
growth is penalized, as shown in many papers, by lacking institutions, geography or both. A
future study will decompose the above results into regional subgroups enabling a con¯rmation
of this hypothesis.
4 Conclusions
To sum up, the results of Silvermann's test for the classical cross-national income approach
clearly proves the emergence of, and ever growing, twin peak phenomenon for the distribution
of average national incomes. This implies a polarisation of average national incomes into a
rich and a poor convergence club. However, this is per se no contradiction to the neo-classical
growth model; it rather indicates that the structural conditions or parameters, which govern
these two convergence clubs, di®er, such that the countries in the poor convergence club can
be argued to be stuck in a low level equilibrium or poverty trap. This realisation would call
for policy intervention by the poorer countries and to get the macro-economic framework and
growth parameters right to set their countries on a higher and sustainable growth path, which
eventually would allow for a catch up with the richer economies.
However, the polarisation of average national incomes does not necessarily imply a divergence
of the global income distribution as a whole, as it does not account for the population share
of the individual national observation nor the country speci¯c income distribution. Our mixed
log-normal approach allows a parametric estimation of the global income distribution, under the
assumption of log-normality of the national income distributions and relatively stable national
income dispersion as measured by the national Gini coe±cient. Our results show that the past
34 years witnessed a strong global income convergence accompanied by a drastic decline of
global inequality and poverty no matter what conceivable poverty line is applied. Furthermore,
the analysis of growth incidence curves shows that over the past 34 years the 10th to 65th
global income percentiles experienced above average percentile growth rates which explains the
17occurring global income convergence.
This in itself can be considered a great success as it shows that in particular the bottom-
middle global income percentiles managed to catch up to higher levels of income reducing the
dispersion of income from a global perspective. On the other hand, the remaining very lowest
quintile also experienced he lowest percentile growth rates, such that the remaining extreme
poor might be particularly hard to reach. This is likely due to the fact that those remaining
poor are mostly citizens of countries whose economies are stuck in a low level income equilibrium
and thus fail to connect to the global growth process. However, poverty also remains a pressing
issue in many countries which managed to launch their economies on a successful growth tra-
jectory, but which have remaining pockets of poverty, in particular in rural areas, within their
national boundaries. Thus, any attempt to reduce global poverty even further must focus on
those countries stuck in general national poverty traps and on remaining, in particular rural,
national pockets of poverty which su®er from very similar structural weaknesses, which hamper
their growth potential and disconnect them from the global growth process. The regional de-
composition of growth shows that countries and regions which managed to participate the most
in globalisation, managed to reduce poverty the fastest, despite considerable caveats of such a
process. Thus, integration, under fair conditions, of structural weak economies and pockets of
poverty into the global economy should be the best guarantee to reduce global poverty even
further assuring that the global community reaches the targeted MDGs.
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21original logarithm
year hc(1) p1 hc(2) p2 hc(1) p1 hc(2) p2 hc(3) p3
1960 1.31 0.58 1.01 0.39 0.45 0.17 0.26 0.34 0.19 0.39
1965 1.21 0.92 1.07 0.58 0.39 0.53 0.28 0.29 0.25 0.07
1970 2.39 0.12 1.52 0.29 0.40 0.53 0.34 0.10 0.27 0.03
1975 3.02 0.03 0.96 0.88 0.51 0.17 0.44 0.00 0.19 0.58
1980 3.39 0.03 1.15 0.84 0.45 0.39 0.45 0.01 0.25 0.16
1985 3.95 0.00 1.37 0.60 0.47 0.27 0.42 0.02 0.16 0.89
1990 4.91 0.00 1.63 0.46 0.50 0.27 0.45 0.03 0.19 0.71
1995 4.94 0.01 1.59 0.75 0.56 0.24 0.52 0.01 0.18 0.79
2000 6.07 0.00 1.86 0.70 0.60 0.15 0.54 0.00 0.16 0.83
2003 6.29 0.01 2.14 0.53 0.63 0.11 0.51 0.01 0.16 0.88
Table 1: Silverman results 1960-2003, 93 countries
original logarithm
year hc(1) p1 hc(2) p2 hc(1) p1 hc(2) p2 hc(3) p3
1970 2.20 0.13 1.52 0.22 0.32 0.61 0.30 0.17 0.23 0.19
1975 2.80 0.01 1.04 0.75 0.39 0.33 0.35 0.05 0.24 0.18
1980 3.01 0.04 1.15 0.79 0.45 0.20 0.37 0.04 0.18 0.66
1985 3.51 0.01 1.37 0.61 0.44 0.23 0.38 0.03 0.17 0.86
1990 4.39 0.00 2.06 0.14 0.44 0.28 0.44 0.01 0.17 0.79
1995 4.42 0.01 2.17 0.25 0.54 0.18 0.48 0.01 0.35 0.06
2000 5.58 0.00 1.87 0.61 0.55 0.16 0.52 0.01 0.16 0.86
2003 5.76 0.00 2.14 0.45 0.59 0.14 0.52 0.00 0.22 0.45
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Figure 1: Density estimates of the cross country income distributions for the years 1970, 1980,
1990 and 2003 with di®erent bandwidths: L2-optimal bandwidth (solid lines), hc(1) (dashed
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Figure 2: Density estimates of the cross country log-income distributions for the years 1970, 1980,
1990 and 2003 with di®erent bandwidths: L2-optimal bandwidth (solid lines), hc(1) (dashed
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Figure 3: Densities of cross country income distributions: 1970 (solid line), 1980 (dashed line),
1990 (dotted line) and 2003 (dashed-dotted line). X-axis: PPP US $ GDP/per capita, base year
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Figure 4: Densities of cross country log-income distribution: 1970 (solid line), 1980 (dashed
line), 1990 (dotted line) and 2003 (dashed-dotted line). X-axis: log PPP US $ GDP/per capita,
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Figure 5: Cumulative distribution functions: 1970 (solid line), 1980 (dashed line), 1990 (dotted
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Figure 6: Cumulative distribution functions: 1970 (solid line), 1980 (dashed line), 1990 (dotted
line) and 2000 (dashed-dotted line). X-axis: log PPP US $ GDP/per capita, base year : 2000,



























1970 0.22 0.45 3,678 809 1,655 0.08 0.21
1975 0.2 0.44 4,061 812 1,787 0.07 0.2
1980 0.14 0.37 4,433 621 1,640 0.05 0.16
1985 0.08 0.28 4,825 386 1,351 0.03 0.1
1990 0.07 0.21 5,256 368 1,104 0.03 0.08
1995 0.07 0.17 5,668 397 963 0.03 0.07
2000 0.06 0.14 6,062 364 849 0.02 0.06
2003 0.05 0.14 6,290 314 881 0.02 0.06















1970 0.7 0.56 0.4 0.93 1.8 0.9
1975 0.7 0.56 0.41 0.94 1.82 0.92
1980 0.69 0.55 0.4 0.92 1.8 0.89
1985 0.68 0.54 0.38 0.9 1.85 0.85
1990 0.67 0.53 0.37 0.89 1.88 0.83
1995 0.66 0.51 0.36 0.85 1.82 0.79
2000 0.65 0.5 0.34 0.82 1.81 0.76
2003 0.64 0.49 0.34 0.79 1.76 0.75
















1970-2003 1.9 3.3 2.67 2.55 2.97
1970-1974 2.07 0.63 1.62 2.19 1.64
1975-1979 2.53 3.15 2.79 2.52 3
1980-1984 1.01 2.48 2.84 5.17 5.11
1985-1989 2.11 3.32 2.16 -0.72 1.11
1990-1994 1.44 3.06 2.12 1.04 1.53
1995-1999 2.37 3.45 2.8 2.7 2.51
2000-2003 1.29 2.19 1.7 0.82 0.94





























0 20 40 60 80 100
Percentiles
Growth incidence curve Growth rate in mean
Mean of growth rates ppgr
1970−2003
Growth Incidence Curve























































































































































































































































Figure 8: Growth incidence curves for ¯ve year periods
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